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In most of the- other states the rule is the same, except that the
doctrine of vice-principalship is recognised, and except that all
those who are charged with the master's duty towards the servants
are representatives of the master, and are not fellow-servantsof the
other servants.
In some states and in the Federal courts there is the further
limitations that no servant is a fellow-servant of one to whom he
is subordinate, and that servants in different departments of duty
are not fellow-servants of each other.
EDGAR- G. MILLER, JR.
Baltimore.
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BRIGGS v. GARRETT.
Citizens and voters have the constitutional right publicly to discuss and canvass
the- qualifications of candidates for public office- and information honestly communicated by one citizea to others at a public meeting, to the effect that a candidate for
such office had been charged by a reputable citizen with grave misconduct, is a privileged communication, and the person communicating such- information is not liable
to an action for libel therefor, although the charge was false in fact and its falsity
could have been discovered by inquiry.
Such communication being privileged, legal malice is not inferable, and on the
trial of a civil action for libel against the party who made the communication the
court is justified, in the absence of proof of actual malice, in entering a nonsuit.
The fact that reporters of the public press were present at the meeting at which,
such privileged communication was made is immaterial.
At a meeting of a body of citizens of Philadelphia, styled the " Committee of One
Hundred," assembled for the purpose of considering the merits of candidates for
public office, a. letter reflecting severely upon the character of one of the judges of
the Common Pleas, who was a capdidate for re-election, by statements subsequently
acknowledged to be wholly untrue, was, by order of the chairman, read by the secretary, and appeared at length the following day in the daily papers. lleld, that the
communication being based upon probable cause, was proper for discusion at such a
meeting, and the court will not reverse a judgment of nonsuit entered in an action
for libel brought against the chairman of the meeting.
MEncun, C.J., and GoRno-r and STERnETT, JJ., dissent.

to Common Pleas No. 1, Philadelphia county.
Reargument. Case, by Amos Briggs against Philip 0. Garrett,
for libel. Plea, not guilty.
ERROR
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Amos Briggs, for plaintiff in error.
George H. -arle, Jr., and Richard P. White, for defendant in
error.
The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court which was
delivered by
PAXSoN, J.-This was an action for a libel. The plaintiff was
nonsuited in the court below, and this writ of error was taken to
the refusal of the court to take it off. It is necessary to an intelligent discussion of the law of the case that we should premise it
by an accurate statement of the facts. I take them as given by the
plaintiff in his history of the case, or proved by his witnesses upon
.the trial. During the year 1882 the plaintiff was an Associate
Judge of the Court of Common Pleas No. 4 for the county of Philadelphia. In the month of September of that year he was nominated for re-election to that office. At that time there was in
existence, in the city of Philadelphia, a voluntary association of
citizens known as the "Committee of One Hundred," of which the
defendant, Philip C. Garrett, was the chairman. It is unnecessary,
and perhaps would be improper, in a judicial opinion, to discuss
the object and work of that committee. It is sufficient for the
purposes of this case to say that it was composed of gentlemen of
the highest respectability, and that its object was political, confined,
however, generally to matters of a municipal character. The rights.
of the committee, whether as a body or as individuals, were precisely those of any other citizens-neither more nor less. At
a public meeting of the committee, held on the 16th day of October
1882, at which the reporters of the city papers were in attendance,
and in their presence and hearing, the defendant stated that he had
received a letter from an ex-city official, in which it was stated that
it was only by the charge of Judge BRIGGs to the jury that the

$200,000 steal in the Hart Creek Sewer Case had been made possible. The defendant then banded the letter to the secretary of the
committee, with the remark that the secretary will read the letter.
The secretary then read the letter aloud, in the presence and hearing of all present. It was as follows:
"10-l1-'82.

"Phlip C. Garrett,-Esq., Presidentof the Committee of a Hu?dred-My DEAR SIR: The Hart Creek sewer steal, of $200,000,
was only made possible by Judge BRIGGS' charge to the jury. See
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the charge and reflect on the ficts. In the first place, the specifications were drawn for the express purpose of driving off all hut ring
bidders. Second. There was no effort made to hold the contractor
to the specifications. He was allowed to tooth the bricks,.when the
specifications called for racking back. Third. The specifications
called for a sewer impervious to water, when it was in evidence that
a large number of crevices would hold a happy family of animals.
Fourth. All the measurements were made by city officials in favor
of the contractor. In one measurement the sewer was measured
$80OOO too long.
T. J. LOVEGKOVR,
"Your obedient servant,
"One of the Hart Creek Sewer Experts."
The writer of this letter was a mechanical expert, and at one
time had been an official in the service of the- city. It was not
denied that he was a reputable citizen. It is equally clear that
Judge BRIGGS did not charge the jury in the Hart Creek Sewer
Case. It was not even tried in his court, and it was conceded that
the charge of the rearned judge who did try it was fair, impartial,
and in every way proper. Upon a motion for a new trial his rulings
were unanimously sustained by the court in bane. Mr. Lovegrove,
the writer of the letter, when on the stand, acknowledged that the
letter, so far as it connected Judge BRIGG9, with the Sewer Case,
was a mistake, and that it was his (Lovegrove's) mistake. He
further stated that he did not communicate with Mr. Garrett, directly
or indirectly, about the letter before sending it. It also appeared
that a few days after the letter was read to the committee, IVMr.
Garrett received a communication stating that it was Judge FELL
and not Judge BRIGGS who tried the Sewer Case, which letter was
read in the same way, and with the same publicity before the committee by Mr. Garrett. The court below, upon this state of facts
held that the letter came within the class of privileged communications in which malice is not presumed; and, as no actual malice
was proved upon the trial, entered a judgment of nonsuit, which
judgment the court in bane subsequently sustained.
In what follows we shall consider merely the responsibility of the
defendant for his part in this transaction. We have nothing to do
with Lovegrove, the writer of the lettter, who originated and sent
forth the charge against Judge BRIGGS. The defendant must answer
precisely as any other citizen and voter.
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Was the letter a libel? We listened to an ingenious and labored
argument at bar to show that it was not. It may be that a trained
lawyer, reading it with care, would understand that the judge in his
charge to the jury was constrained by the law, or the state of the
evidence before him, to charge in the way he did, although the result
might be an unrighteous verdict. This is often the case, and yet
no blame can be imputed to the judge. But would the public so
regard it ? There was no allegation that the object of the letter
was to commend the action of Judge BRIGGS in the Bart Creek
Sewer Case. That it was intended as a reflection is too plain for
argument; and, assuming the statements contained in the letter to
be true, regard being had to the excited state of the public mind at
that time in reference to municipal corruption, we can understand
that ii would have a damaging effect upon the public mind. Those
who knew Judge BRIGaS, and the perfect integrity with which he
carried himself in his high office, would not be influenced'by such a
letter. It is not necessary, however, in the view we take of the
case, to discuss this question at length. We shall assume the letter
to be actionable, unless excused by the circumstances attending its
publication.
This brings us face to'face with the question, in what manner and
to what extent the fitness of a candidate for a public office may be
discussed by the people whose votes may elect or defeat him. It is
a question of supreme importance, involving, on the one hand, the
liberty of the press ; on the other, the rights of the people to be
secure in their property and reputation. Both are provided for in
article 1, § 7, of the constitution, which declares: '"The printing
press shall be free to every person who may undertake to examine
the proceedings of the legislature, or any branch of government,
and no law shall ever be made to restrain the right thereof. The
free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable
rights of man, and every citizen may freely speak, write, and print
on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty. [No
conviction shall be had in any prosecution for the publication of
papers relating to the official conduct of officers, or men in public
capacity, or to any other matter proper for public investigation
or information, where the fact that such publication was not maliciously or negligently made shall be established to the satisfaction of
the jury, and in all indictments for libels the jury shall have the
right to determine the law and the facts under the direction of the
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court, as in other cases.]" The portion of the section inclosed in
brackets is new ; the balance thereof is to be found: in the constitution of 1838. The new portion refers only to a trial upon an
indictment for libel, and does-not apply to a civil action to recover
damages. Barr v. Moore, 87 Penn. St. 385. Its discussion at
present is therefore unnecessary.
The right of the citizen here given, to "freely speak, write or r
print," is as broad as language can make it, with the single limitation that he shall be responsible for the abuse of that privilege.
Did Mr. Garrett abuse it ? When Judge BRIGGs accepted the
nomination as a candidate for re-election to the judicial station
which he then filled, he threw out a challenge to the entire body of
voters of the county of Philadelphia to canvass his qualifications
and fitness for that position. That. involved, in the "fierce light
that beats upon the bench," not only his official conduct for the term
about closing, but, generally, his fitness for the position of judge.
In this may be included many things beyond mere legal knowledge.
A man may be a learned lawyer, and yet be wholly unfit for judicial
station. There may be faults of temper, mental idiosyncrasies,
and such manner of walk and conversation in private life as a people
jealous of the reputation of their judiciary would never tolerate. If,
therefore, these are elements proper for consideration in forming an
estimate of judicial character, they are proper subjects for discussion, within the limits defined by the constitution. What those
limits are I shall endeavor, as briefly as the importance of the
subject will allow, to point out, so far as they affect this case. As
preliminary to this discussion, it may not be out of place to refer
to the latest deliverance of this court upon this subject. It will be
found in .E parte Steinman, 95 Penn. St. 220. In that case the
plaintiffs in error, who were editors of a newspaper, as well as
members of the bar were disbarred by the court below for publishing an article in their newspaper reflecting on the official conduct
of the court. The order was reversed by this court, in an opinion by
the late Chief Justice SHARSWOOD, in the course of which he said:
"Judges, in 1835, were appointed by the governor, and their tenure
of office was during good behavior.

There might, then, be some

reason for holding that an appeal to the tribunal of popular opinion
was, in all cases of judicial misconduct, a mistaken course, and
unjustifiable in an attorney. The proceedings by impeachment or
by address were the course, and the only course, which could be
VOL. XXXIV.-63
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resorted to, to effectually remedy the supposed evil. To petition
the legislature was then the proper step. To appeal to the people
was to diminish confidence in the court, and bring them into contempt without any good result. We need not say that the case is
altered, and that it is now the right and the duty of a lawyer to
bring to the notice of the people who elect the judges every instance
of what he believes to be corruption or partisanship." A lawyer,
by reason of his constant intercourse with the court, has greater
facilities for forming a correct opinion of the character of the judge.
But he has no higher right to comment thereon than has the citizen
who elects him, and whose life, liberty and property may depend
upon his official action.
. In considering Mr. Garrett's liability for what occurred on the
16th of October, we must confine ourselves to his own acts. He
made no charge against Judge BRIGGS, nor did he indorse one.
He had no knowledge or information in regard to the subject-matter of the charge, nor did he profess to have. He received a letter
from a reputable citizen, addressed to him as chairman of the committee, containing certain statements about Judge BRIGOS, then a
candidate before the people for re-election. If true, the matter was
important, and proper for public information. The plaintiff con,
ceded this. The letter was intended, as its address plainly indicates,
not for Mr. Garrett individually, but for the committee. He was
merely the conduit through which it was to pass. What did he do?
As before stated, he said to the committee that he had received a
letter from an ex-city official, containing a charge (specifying it)
against Judge BRIGGS. This was true. He had received such a
letter, and it did contain such a charge. He then, in the usual
course of business, handed the letter to the secretary, with instructions to read it, and it was read. This is the sum of Mr. Garrett's
offending. Much stress was laid upon the fact that the reporters
were present, and that the letter was scattered broadcast over the
country next morning by the press. But for this the newspapers
were responsible, and whether their act was justified or otherwise
is a matter for which Mr. Garrett cannot be held responsible. It
was not his act.
Was Mr. Garrett justified in giving the letter to the committee
in the manner he did ? As it was not a private letter, but addressed
to the -ommittee through him, he might perhaps have questioned
his right to withhhold it from those for whom it was intended. But
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we will not decide the case upon such a narrow point as this. We
prefer to meet the broad question presented by the record. As
before observed, Mr. Garrett had no knowledge as to the truth of
the matters alleged in the letter. The plaintiff contends he had no
right to make public its contents without having first made an investigation into the facts; and the words in the letter, "See the charge,
and reflect on the facts," were pressed upon our attention as being
calculated to put him upon inquiry. But we do not place such a
construction upon this language. It was intended to emphasize
the charge contained in the letter, not to express a doubt as to its
truth. On the other hand, the defendant contended that the letter
was a privileged communication; that it was written in good faith;
that it was sent to Air. Garrett, and by him communicated to the
committee in good faith, and for a proper purpose; that, if true,
the matters alleged were proper for public information; that, if
untrue, it was still privileged, unless the parties knew it to be false,
and therefore malicious. The plaintiff admits that if it was privileged, no recovery can be had without proof of actual malice.
There was no proof of actual malice upon the trial, and it is almost
unnecessary to say that the law does not imply malice in a privileged communication.
This brings us to the vital question in the cause, was this letter
a privileged communication? We are here met with the inquiry,
is falsehood privileged? I answer, no. A lie is never privileged.
It always has malice coiled up within it. When a man coins and
utters a lie, or when he repeats it knowing it to he false, the law
implies malice, and he cannot shelter himself behind the doctrine
of privileged communications. I may illustrate this by the familiar
instance of an inquiry into the character of a servant. If I say I
believe him to be a thief, upon information derived from others, or
from facts and circumstances within my own knowledge-in other
words, if my statement is based upon probable cause,-the communication is privileged, and I am not responsible, even though it
should appear I was entirely mistaken. If, on the contrary, I
knowingly and falsely accuse him of dishonesty, such charge is not
privileged, and I am liable in damages for the consequences of such
statement. We have no concern with the knowledge or motive of
the writer of the letter. Conceding, for the purposes of this case,
that every word contained therein is false, and was known to be so
by the writer; that it was sent out of pure malice to injure and
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defame Judge BRIGGs-no such knowledge was brought home to
Mr. Garrett, nor is there anything in the case from which it would
be justly imputed to him. So far as he is concerned, it was a mistake-nothing more. The difference between an honest mistake
made in the pursuit of a proper object, and a wilful falsehood, coined
for the purpose of deception, is so palpable that we may well be
excused from dwelling upon it at length. It is mistakes, not lies,
that are protected under the doctrine of privilege. A communication to be privileged, must be made upon a proper occasion, from a
proper motive, and must be based upon reasonable or probable cause.
When so made, in good faith, the law does not imply malice from
the communication itself, as in the ordinary case of libel ; actual
malice must be proved before there can be a recovery; and whether
a communication be privileged or not is a question for the court,
not the jury.
An action for libel is upon all fours with an action for a malicious
prosecution. The latter is but an aggravated form of an action for
libel, as in it the libel is sworn to before a magistrate. The cases
make no distinction between them. When, therefore, a man may
charge another, under oath, before a magistrate, with a high crime,
without responsibility therefor, provided he acts upon probable'
cause, surely he may, upon probable cause, charge a candidate for a
public office with an act which, if true, would render him an unfit
person to receive the suffrages of the people; and if probable cause
exists in either case, the question of malice becomes of no importance. It is useless to cite the authorities upon this point; they all
agree. I will refer, however, in passing to Chapman v. Calder, 14
Penn. St. 865; Winabiddle v. Porterfield, 9 Id. 137; Travis v.
Smith, 1 Id. 834.
Before I proceed further, I will notice some of the cases in which
the principle has been applied. In Cray v. Pentland, 2 S. & R.
23, it was held that accusations preferred to the governor, against a
person in office, are so far in the nature of judicial proceedings that
the accuser is not held to prove the truth of them. It is excused
if they did not originate in malice, and without probable cause; in
other words, that the accusations were privileged, and raised no
presumption of malice. It was not contended in that case, nor do
I know that it has been in any other, that a man may use the cloak
of a privileged communication as a cover for malice and falsehood.
In 1l1arks v. Baker, 28 Minn. 162, the principle is thus
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stated by the Supreme Court of Minnesota : "1The rule is that a
communication, made in good faith, upon any subject-matter in
which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to
which he has a duty, public or private, either legal, moral or social,
if made to a person having a corresponding interest or- duty, is
privileged; that in"such case the inference of malice, which the law
draws from defamatory words, is rebutted, and the onus of proving
actual malice is cast upon the person claiming to have been defamed." To the same point are Quin v. Scott, 22 Minn. 456;
Lauglton v. Bishop of Lodor, L. R., 4 P. C. 495; Toofoocd v.
Sprying, 1 Cr., Al. & R. 193; Harrisonv. Bush, 5 E. & B. 344;
Add. Torts, § 1091 ; Moak's Underh. Torts 146. If fairly warranted by any reasonable occasion or exigency, and honestly made,
the communication is protected for the common convenience and
welfare of society: Toogood v. Sprying, aupra. It is sufficient to
confer the privilege that the matter is of public interest to the
community: Kelly v. Tinling, L. R., I Q. B. 699; Purcell v.
Lowler, I C. P. Div. 731 ; Palner v. Concord, 48 N. H. 211 ;
Cooley Torts. 217. And where the subject-matter is of interest to
tax-payers, the communication is privileged, if made in good faith:
Smith v. Higgins, 16- Gray 251; Brush v. Prosser,11 N. Y. 347.
Where the communication is privileged, plaintiff must show that it
was not true, and that defendant had no reasonable grounds to
believe that it was true: ltXc.ntyre v. Bean, 13 U. C. Q. B. 540.
When the communication is privileged, and made or used in good
faith, the plaintiff must sue the original slanderer, not him who
repeats it in good faith: Derry v. Handley 16 Law T. (N. S.) 263.
"I conceive the law to be that, though that which is spoken or
written may be injurious to the character of the party, yet if done
bona fide, as with a view to the investigation of a fact in which the
party is interested, it is not libellous :" Lord ELLENBonoUGir, in

-Delaney v. Jones, 3 Esp. 393. If there is probable cause, it is of
no consequence that the libel was malicious : Streetz v. W~ood, 15
Barb. 105; Cook v. Hill, 3 Sandf. 350; Klink v. Colby, 46 N. Y.
427 ; Bradley v. Heath, 12 Pick. 163. In an action for a libellous
communication to the appointing power, held, that the principles
applicable for suits for a malicious prosecution govern, and, probable cause is a full defence: Howard v. Thompson, 21 Wend.
319; Thorn v. Blanchard, 5 Johns. 508. In case of a privileged
communication, probable cause is a bar to the suit: Chapman v.
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Calder, 14 Penn. St. 365. Charges made by a tax-payer at a
public meeting are privileged: Spencer v. Amaton, I Moo. & R.
470. One of- the strongest cases of privilege is that of Brett v.
Watson, 20 Wkly. Rept. 723, where the defendant was employed
to find out the character of a house. He was informed that it was
a house of prostitution, and it was false. He repeated what he had
been told to others, his object being bond fide to ascertain the
character of the house. It was held that his communications were
privileged. It is needless to multiply authorities. The doctrine
of the foregoing cases is fully recognised in our own cases of Gray
v. Pentland,2 S. & R. 23; 4 Id. 420, 430; PFlitcraftv. Jenks, 3
Whart. 158; Chapman v. Calder, 14 Penn. St. 365; Brocekerman v. Keyser, 5 Clark 152.
A number of authorities were cited by the plaintiff, which he
contended were in conflict with the foregoing. Among others was
Barr v. Moore, 87 Penn. St. 385. The most that can be made of
that case is that it ruled that the publication in question was not
privileged, and therefore was governed by the ordinary law of libel.
No one doubts the accuracy of that ruling. The article was not
only a libel upon its face: it was utterly false; was coined by the
party who published it; without even a pretence that there was
probable or reasonable ground to believe the charges were true. The
pretence that it was proper for public information was a mere cloak
to cover up malice, and to publish a falsehood for political effect.
That case was decided upon sound principles, and does not touch
the one in hand. The language of the court must be considered in
connection with its facts.
Rowland v. Decamp, 96 Penn. St. 493, also cited by plaintiff,
was an action of slander against a public officer. The charge was
that he was a "damned thief," and that, "if any of the borough
bonds [meaning the borough of Verona bonds] came into his hands
[meaning the plaintiff's], he would steal them and run away with
them." It was not shown that the charge was true, or that there
was probable cause to make it. As before observed, mere lies are
not privileged. A man may not charge a public officer with being
a thief, knowing it to be false, and in the absence of reasonable,
probable cause the scienter will be presumed. Malice follows
of course. Public officials are not outlaws, to be hounded and
maligned at the will of every person who may have incurred their
enmity, and no well-considered case hai so decided. There is no
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room for the application of the doctrine of privilege to such
instances.
Some stress was laid upon the fact that, even if 'the reading of
the letter to the Committee of One Hundred was excusable on the
ground of privilege, the privilege was taken away because of the
presence of the reporters, and Parsons v. Singey, 4 F. & L. 247,
was cited in support of this view. But the circumstance was overlooked that the reporters were also citizens and voters. They had
the same interest in the fitness of Judge BRIGGS for judicial station
as had the- committee or any other citizens. If it was proper to
read the letter at- all, it was proper to do so in their presence and
hearing
Hamiton v. .no, 81 N. Y. 126, and several other cases cited to
show that to falsely accuse a public officer of a crime is not privileged, are-wide of the mark. Supposing the letter to impute crime
tor Judge BRIGGS, whether it be misbehavior or corruption in office,
we must not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Garrett made no such
charge. He made no charge whatever. All he said was that some
one else had made a charge in writing, stating briefly what Judge
BRIGGS had been charged with, giving the name of the writer and
the letter itself to the committee. How widely this differs from
originating a false charge is plain to the dullest comprehension. I
call attention to the facts of the case again that we may not be led
astray upon a false issue.
The case narrows itself down to this: Conceding that a public
officer, or a candidate for a public office, may not be falsely and
maliciously charged with crime, or with anything else injurious to
his reputation, have the voters, whose suffrages he solicited, the
right to canvass and discuss his qualifications, openly and freely,
without subjecting themselves to fine or imprisonment, or a ruinous
suit for damages? If the voters may not speak, write, or print
anything but such facts as they can establish with judicial certainty, the right does not exist, unless in such form that a prudent
man would hesitate to exercise it. Is not the fact that a candidate
is charged with crime by reputable citizens a matter proper for public information? Suppose, in the case in band, the charge against
Judge BRIGGS had been one for which he might have been indicted,
is it possible that when two or three voters are gathered together,
or where two or three hundred are assembled to consider his fitness
for his office, the fact that such a charge had been made may not be
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stated by one voter to the other without the peril of being mulated
in damages in case the charge should subsequently appear to be unfounded? And this, for an office for which the incumbent or the
candidate should be like COsar's wife ? A man's reputation may
be bad upon many points that it would be difficult to prove. So,
long as he remains in private life it matters little; but when he
becomes a candidate for office, even his private vices may become a
matter of public concern. There are some official positions as to
which the people are properly jealous of the character of those who
aspire to them. The judicial office is one of these, and it is not too
much to say that there are many private vices which the people
would not tolerate, if openly and notoriously indulged in by a judge.
They would tear the ermine from his shoulders, and hurl him from
te bench. If, then, a candidate be a person of evil repute, in the
sense that it affects his fitness for the office which he seeks-if
respectable citizens honestly so believe and so state-may riot such
statement'be repeated by others in connection with the canvass, at
.proper times and upon proper occasions, without the penalty of a
libel suit? If not, we have indeed fallen upon evil times, and our
boasted freedom is but a delusion. The principle contended for
here, if sustained by this court, would put a padlock upon the mouth
of every voter, and intelligent free discussion of the fitness of public men for office would cease. It would be a burden too grievous
to be borne, and the people would be swift to reverse our decision,
either by an act of assembly, or, if necessary, a change in the
organic law. However unfounded the statements in the letter are
now acknowledged to be, it is clear to our view that Mr. Garrett
had probable cause for handing it to the committee, and had the
charge been of a criminal nature, there was probable cause for a
prosecution.
Referring to the three tests of privileged communication to which
I have already alluded, they will all be found in this case. The
occasion was a proper one. The meeting was composed of a body
of citizens and voters assembled for the very purpose of considering
the merits of candidates for office. At such meeting it certainly
was the right, if not the duty, of any person present to state an3
fact bearing upon the fitness of either of said candidates for tht
positions they respectively aspired' to. The circumstance that one.
of the candidates had been charged by a reputable citizen with con.
duct which was not consistent with a proper performance of officia:
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duty was a fact which every elector present had a right to know-and
to state. For aught that appears, it was done from- a proper.motive,
and we have already said it was based upon probable cause. It was
a mistake, but an honest one, and corrected as soon as digcovered.
It was a subject of just annoyance to Judge BRIGGs, and: if' the law
does not furnish him the redress he seeks, it is because of a rule of
public policy of far more importance than the inconvenience of a
single citizen. That rule requires that free discussion, especially
upon political topics and candidates, shall not be so hampered as to
make its exercise dangerous. The rule furnishes no shelter for the
malicious libeller of private character, but it will not impute malice
to one who honestly acts upon infbrmation received from other reputable citizens. We are accustomed so to act in all the affairs of
private life, and if it we restrain it in public matters. we afford protection to all the rogues and thieves who may, by their own cunning, or the negligence of the people, get into public office. In the
enforcement of all general rules there will always be cases of individual hardship. But this is the sacrifice which the individualmust make for the public good, just as the soldier is shot down in
battle to preserve for others the blessings of free government.
Speaking for myself, I would rather endure undeserved reproach
than by any act of mine to impair a rule of so much importance to
the public welfare. The people, sometimes hasty, are in the end.
always just, and will not long permit any public man to remain
under a cloud, unless it is one of his own raising- Judgment
affirmed.
MIERCUR, 0.J.-With all due respect for the judgment of the
majority of this court, I must dissent therefrom. I will state some
of the reasons which move me to this conclusion. The only question before us is whether the court below erred in not submitting
the case to the jury. Although there may have been circumstances
proper to consider in mitigation of damages, yet if, in any aspect
of the case, the facts should have gone to the jury, it was error to
withhold them.
It is well-settled law that any malicious publication, written,
printed or painted, which, by words or signs, tends to expose a person to contempt, ridicule, hatred, or degradation of character, is a
libel ; and the person libelled may recover damages, unless it be
shown that the publication was true, or that it was justifiably made:
VOL. XXXIV.-64
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.Pittock v. O'Neill, 63 Penn. St. 253; Barr v. Moore, 87 Id. 885;
Neeb v. Hope, J7 W eekly Notes Cases 93. While malice is an essential element in an action of libel, yet that must be understood in its
legal signification. It may exist in the absence of lawful excuse,
and where there may be no ill-will or disposition to injure others.
Legal malice alone is sufficient to support an action. If a publication have the other qualities of a libel, and it be wilful and not
privileged, malice may be inferred: Id.' An act, unlawful in itself
and injurious to another, is considered to be done malo animo:
Pittock v. O'Neill, supra. Where the words used are of dubious
import, they are to be interpreted according to the sense in which
they were actually used: Hays v. Brierly, 4 Watts 392. The
.words of a libellous publication are to be taken in their natural
sense. Words are not to be received in mitiori sensu, but in the
plain and popular sense in which the world in general understands
them: Lukehart v. Byerly, 53 Penn. St. 418. It is elementary
law that every one who prints or publishes a libel may be sued by
the person defamed, and to such an action it is no defence that it
was printed or published by the desire or procurement of another,
whether that other be made a defendant to the action or not. All
concerned in publishing the libel, or in procuring it to be published,
are equally responsible with the author: Odgers, Sland. & Lib.
157: Townsh. Sland. & Lib. 167.
The letter, for the publication of which this suit was brought, contains a strong imputation against the integrity of the plaintiff, and
that it was only by his official action and charge to the jury that a
specified steal of $200,000 was made possible. He was then serving as judge, and was a candidate for re-election. Giving to the
language of the letter the plain and reasonable sense in which people generally would understand it, there cannot be any doubt that
it imputes to him great misconduct or degradation of official character. So understood, they were libellous per se, and presumptively
actionable. To remove this presumption the burden of proof is
thrown on the defendant. It is conceded that the charge against
the plaintiff was unqualifiedly false. He gave no charge to the
jury in the Hart Creek Sewer Case, and was not in any manner
connected with the trial relatinZ thereto. Admitting this tQ be so,
it is claimed on the part of the defendant that the publication was
privileged. It is certain that the publication in this case was not
made under circumstances to be what the law declares to be abso.iutely privileged. It was not published in any legislative body
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known to the law, nor was it in any judicial proceedings. At most,
the occasion could not make the publication any more than a qualified privilege. When a defendant, charged with libel, invokes such
a protection to shield him from liability for that for which he would
otherwise be held responsible he must prove that the occasion and
surrounding circumstances made his action justifiable. The natural
right of personal security consists in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and
his reputation: 1 B1. Comm. 134. The security of his reputation
or good name from the arts of detraction and slander are rights to
which every man is entitled by reason and natural justice. The
right to protect reputation is inherent in man. A good reputation
is too valuable to admit of its being falsely and wrongfully assailed,
without the law giving some redress to the person injured : Barrv.
Moore, 87 Penn. St. 386. A reasonable and fair communication
of thoughts and opinions is an invaluable right of man, yet a check
on such freedom is imposed by the constitution of this commonwealth. Thus article 1, sect. 7, thereof, inter alia, declares that
"every citizen may freely speak, write and print on any subject,
being responsible for the abuse of that liberty." Thus this right or
liberty is not one of unlimited license, but is restrained by a legal
responsibility: Barr v. Moore, supra. That the merits and demerits affecting the qualifications and character of one who is a candidate for a judicial office, as well as of one who is a candidate for
any other public office, may be freely discussed and commented on,
cannot be successfully questioned. These comments, however, have
their bounds and limits. The right to discuss and to comment does
not imply a license to falsely charge a person holding a judicial
position, who is a candidate for re-election, with a specific act reflecting on his judicial integrity, and calculated to bring him into contempt and ridicule. Whenever a person makes such a charge, and
claims protection under the name of a qualified privilege, the question of his motive in making it should be submitted to the jury. In
my opinion it is clear error for the court to decide, as matter of
law, that there was neither actual nor legal malice to be implied
from the false charge. The well-recognised rule of lawis correctly
stated in Odgers, Sland. & Lib. 199. He says: "If, indeed, there
were any means at hand for ascertaining the truth, of which the
defendant neglects to avail himself, and he chooses rather to remain
in ignorance, when he might have obtained full information, there
will be no pretence for any claim of privilege."
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In the present case the defendant was asked by his informant to
"Csee the charge" of the judge, and to "reflect on the facts" shown
thereby; in other words, to look at the record, and inform himself
whether the construction put on the charge by the writer of the
letter was correct. That record was conveniently accessible to the
defendant. Any such record was a public record, kept in the centre of this city. The means were readily at hand for him to ascertain the truth. He neglected to avail himself of those means, and
omitted to make an inquiry. He chose to remain in ignorance.
The slightest examination would have shown that the improper
conduct attributed to the plaintiff was false. Then, in the language
of the law, there can be "no pretence for any claim of privilege."
If. such an allegation had been made against a personal friend of
the defendant, it is hardly possible to conceive that he would have
spread it before the public without first having made some effort to
verify its correctness. "The plaintiff, however, is not bound to
prove malice by extrinsic evidence. He may rely on the words of
the libel itself, and on the circumstances attending its publication,
as affording evidence of malice :" Odgers, Sland. & Lib. 270. The
falsity of the words implies malice: .Farleyv. Ranck, 3 W. & S.
554; Gorman v. Sutton, 32 Penn. St. 247. As inquiry became
the duty of the defendant before publishing the libel, he must be
visited with constructive notice of what he could so readily have
obtained by reasonable effort.
It may be asked, are the people to be prevented from criticising
and discussing the conduct, character and qualifications of a candidate for office ? Undoubtedly they are not. They must, however,
confine themselves within the limits of truth, or permit a jury to
pass upon their good faith and motive when they make a false charge:
Starkie Sland. 110.
In an action for libel, it is for the court to determine whether the
alleged libel is a privileged communication; but the question of
good faith, belief in the truth of the statement, and the existence
of actual malice, are questions for the jury.
Without elaborating the case further, I earnestly dissent from the
action of the learned judge in deciding all these questions as matter
of law, and in not permitting the jury to pass upon them.
GORDON and STERRETT, JJ., also dissent from an affirmance of
the judgment, and concur in this opinion.
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BRONSON v. BRUCE
Charges of crime, which are false, made in a newspaper against a candidate for
Congress, though made without malice and in an honest belief of-their truth, are not
privileged communications; -but. ifthey were published in good faith, after reasonable and proper investigation, this factmay go to mitigation of damages.

ERROR to Mecosta.
Frankc Damon, for plaintiff and appellant.
Stone & Hyde, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered byCHAmPLIN, J.-_t the general election in the year 1882, theplaintiff was a candidate for Congress. The defendant was then
editor and publisher of the "Big Bapids Current," a newspaper
published in the city of Big Rapids, in the county of Mlecosta, and
circulated in that and other counties in the congressional district
which was sought to be represented in Congress by the plaintiff. as
well as in other counties of the state outside of said district. The
defendant, through the columns of his newspaper, opposed the election of the plaintiff to the office for which he was a candidate, and
supported the election of the opposing candidates. After the plaintiff was placed in nomination for the office, and before the election
to be held for representative in Congress, the defendant published
in his paper, and circulated throughout the district, and sent the
same to exchanges in other parts of the state, certain articles concerning the plaintiff which the plaintiff claims to be libellous, and
this action is brought to recover damages therefor. The defendant
pleaded the general issue, and gave notice (1), that he would prove
that he was justified in so doing, for the reason that the alleged
defamatory matter, and the several statements in the articles so
published by defendant, were each true in substance and in fact as
published; and (2), that the same was a privileged communication,
and statements therein were bona fide comments upon the acts and
statements of said plaintiff of the several matters referred to therein,
and of the acts, statements and conduct of the plaintiff in reference
thereto, and of and concerning the plaintiff as a public man, and
made for the public good, and were published as such comments
without any malicious intent or motive whatever. At the trial the
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publication was not disputed, or that the article is libellous if not
true. It charged him with the crime of forgery; of the theft of
deposits of poor men and women; and of cheating laboring men of
their hard earnings.
Two questions are raised upon the charge of the court: (1) Upon
the correctness of his instructions relative to the privileged character
of the publication ; and (2) upon his instructions relative to the
mitigation of damages.
The learned judge, after stating that privileged communications
are of two kinds, and defining and illustrating what is absolute privilege, instructed the jury relative to qualified privilege as follows "There is another kind of privilege which is not absolute, but which
is conditioned, on the theory that there is no malice on the part of
the person uttering the communication or publishing the libel. It
is competent-it is justifiable-for the press to comment upon the
character and standing-intellectually, morally, physically, and
otherwise-of a man who offers himself as a candidate for office of
trust. I say it is competent to do that, depending, of course, upon
the circumstances of the case and the surroundings. When a man
sees fit to take the stand before his constituency for a public position
and public honors, he thereby, to a certain extent, makes himself.
public property, subjects himself to criticism by his constituency.
And if it is made to appear that the criticism is just, is proper,
is made in good faith, is made without malice and for the public
good, for the purpose, as supposed by the person at the time, to
prevent an incompetent and unfit and unsuitable person from receiving the majority of the votes of the electors of the district, or as
the case may be, that article is primafacie privileged, and the law
will require of the party who complains of the article to show that
the same was published with bad motives, and not for good ends and
purposes. * * * When that is shown, that privilege vanishes, and
it is no longer a protection to the person apparently covered by it
in the first instance. In this case, gentlemen, it appears beyond
dispute that, at the time of the publication of these articles, Mr.
Bronson was a candidate on a fusion ticket for Congress from this
congressional district, and 'as then before the people for that purpose. These articles were published of and concerning him, reflecting upon his character and standing as a man, and his connection
with the Exchange Bank, &c. And it is claimed by Mr. Bruce
.that he published these with good motives and justifiable ends, and
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with no malice whatever.

That is lins claim.

If that is true,-if he

had no maliceno disposition to specially-injure this man, Mr. Bronson, but published the same in good faith, honestly believing that
the occasion required it-then the communication is privileged, and
the plaintiff cannot recover in this suit, even though the communications themselves were false; because if they were privileged by
the occasion, that is a complete justification to the action. Right
here is the starting point in the case: Were the articles privileged?
They are prima facie privileged by the occasion, in my judgment,
and I so charge you as matter of law. But it will be for you to,
determine whether this man Bruce, in the publication of the article,
was actuated by private malice, or malice of any sort, at that time.
If so, then that privilege ceased."
The constitution of this state provides that "no law shall ever be
passed. to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press;
but every person may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments
on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of such right."
Article 4, § 42. The publisher of a newspaper possesses no immunity from liability in publishing a libel, other than or different from
any other person. The law makes no distinction between the newspaper publisher and any private person who may publish an article
in a newspaper or other printed form; and if either of them abuses
the right to publish his sentiments on any subject and upon any
occasion, he must defend himself upon the same legal ground.
As was said by the Supreme Court of West, Virginia in Sweeny
v. Baker,13 W. Va. 183: "The fact that one is a candidate for
office in the gift of the people affords, in many instances, a legal
excuse for publishing language concerning him as such candidate
for which publication there would be no legal excuse if he did not
occupy the position of such candidate, whether the publication is
made by the the proprietors of a newspaper, or by- a voter or other
person having an interest in the election. The conduct and actions
of such candidate may be freely commented upon, his acts may be
canvassed, and his conduct boldly censured. Nor is it material that
such criticism of conduct should, in the estimate of the jury, be
just. The right to criticise the action or conduct of a candidate is
a right, on the part of the party making the publication, to judge
himself of the justness of the criticism. If he was liable for
damages in an action for libel for a publication criticising the conduct or action of such a candidate, if a jury should hold his criticism
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unjust, his right of criticism would be a delusion-a mere trap.
The only limitation to the right of criticism of the acts or conduct
of a candidate for an office in the gift of the people is that the criticism be bona fide. As this right of criticism is confined to the acts
or conduct of such candidate, whenever the facts which constitute
the act or conduct criticised are not admitted, they must of course
be proven. * * * His talents and qualification, mentally and physically, for the office he asks at the hands of the people, may be freely
commented on in publications in a newspaper, and, though such
comments be harsh and unjust, no malice will be implied; for these
are matters of opinion of which the voters are the only judges; but
no one has a right by a publication to impute to such candidate,
falsely, crimes, or publish allegations affecting his character falsely."
The authorities are numerous, and fully sustain the position that
a publication in a newspaper concerning either a public officer, or a
candidate for an elective office, which falsely imputes to him a crime,
is not privileged by the occasion, either absolutely or qualifiedly,
but such publication is actionable per se; the law imputing malice
to the publisher or author: Cor. v. Clap, 4 Mass. 165; Curtis v.
3fussey, 6 Gray 261; Aldrich v. Press PrintingCo., 9 Minn. 133
(Gil. 123); Seely v. Blair, Wright (Ohio) 358, 683; Boot v. King,
7 Cow. 613; King v. Root, 4 Wend. 113; .earickv. Wilcox, 81
Ill. 77, 81 ; Cor. v. Odell, 3 Pitts. 449-459 ; Brewer v. Weakley,
2 Overt. 99.
It was said by Mr. Justice CAMPBELL, in the case of -Detroit
.DailyPost v. AeArthur, 16 Mich. 447, that "the law favors the
freedom of the press so long as it does not interfere with private
reputation, or other rights entitled to protection. And, inasmuch
as the newspaper press is one of the necessities of civilization, the
conditions under which it is required to be conducted should not be
unreasonable or vexatious." And again : "Where the wrong done
consists in a libel, which can never be accidental, the publishing is
therefore always imputed as a wrong motive, and that motive is
called malicious."
In Wittemore v. Weiss, 33 Mich. 353, COOLEY, C. J., said: "The
judge charged the jury that malice is to be presumed from the publication and its falsity; that to rebut this presumption, defendants
must prove that they made the publication in good faith, believing
it to be true in all its essential paris, and for a proper purpose.
Defendants insist that the purpose is immaterial if they believed
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what they published and made the publication in good faith. This
might be so if'the publication had been true ; but good faith cannot
protect a false publication 1 nor can one excuse himself for making
a mistaken assault upon his neighbor's reputation, by showing the
absence of malice, when, even had his charge been true, there was no
purpose in bringing the matter to public notice- If one makes an
attack which the occasion does not justify, there is no injustice in
requiring him to show the truth."
In Bailey v. Kalamazoo-Publsng Co., 40 Aich. 251, 257,
CAMPBELL, C. J., said.: "The public are interested in knowingthe
character of candidates for Congress; and while no man can lawfully destroy the reputation of a candidate by falsehood, yet if an
honest mistake is made, in an honest attempt to enlighten the public, it must reduce the damage to the minimum if the fault itself is
not serious, and there should be nounreasonable responsibility when
there is no actual malice."
In Peoples v. -Detroit-Post Tribune 'o., 54 Mich. 457, 462,
Mr. Justice SHEnWOOD said: "There can be no question- at this
late day but that the public newspaper has the right (whether it
shall be regarded as its duty or not) to discuss those matters which
relate, to the life, habits, comfort, happiness, and welfare of the
people. In doing so it may state facts, draw its own inferences,
ancl give its own views upon the facts. It may err in its deductions,
and if they are false they are not actionable unless special damages
are shown; but false assertions, when they impute the commission
of a crime are actionable, and, when not based upon any-facts legally
tending to prove the acts imputed, the publication cannot be said
to be privileged."
These excerpts from the decisions of this court show that they are
in harmony with the authorities cited from other courts. The
electors of a congressional district are interested in knowing the
truth, not falsehoods, concerning the qualifications and character of'
one who offers to represent them in Congress : and itis the right and
privilege of any elector, or person also having an interest to be
represented, to freely citicise the act and conduct of such candidate
and show, if he can, why such person is unfit; to be intrusted with
the office, or why the suffrages of the electors should not be cast for
him.
But defamation is not a necessary and indispensable
concomitant of an election contest. " Slander," says Judge OVERTON. "1is no more justifiable when spoken of a man with a view to
'
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his election than on any other occasion. Unhappy, indeed, would be
any people when, in the exercise of one right, you destroy as
important a one. Let his talents, his virtues, and such vices as are
likely to affect his public character be freely discussed, but no falsehoods be propagated." To hold that false charges of a defamatory
character made against a candidate are privileged as matters of law
if made in good faith, and that the party making them is absolutely
shielded against liability, it seems to me is a most pernicious doctrine. It would deter all sensitive and honorable men from accepting the candidacy to office, and leave the field to the profligate, the
unprincipled and unworthy ; to men who have no character to lose,
no reputation to blemish. It could scarcely be expected that any
man worthy of the position would consent to stand for an office, and
have his reputation tarnished, his good name scandalized in the face
of the whole community, if such doctrine as this is to prevail.
Besides, under the guise of assisting the people to select a t man, the
voters are deceived by falsehood and induced to withhold their support from the maligned candidate, and so two wrongs are perpetrated,
one upon the candidate, the other in misleading the voter. Under
such a rule the advocates of both or all candidates would let fly their
poisoned shafts of defamation and charges, to be met with countercharges, until the bewildered voter, not knowing who or what to
believer must of necessity shut his eyes to the fitness and character
of the candidates, and join the ranks of the party whose banner
bears the inscription, " Principles, not Men."
In a representative form of government, the public morals and
the administration of public affairs cannot rise to a higher plane
than the character of those who are elected as representatives, or to
fill the offices. If public virtue is to prevail, and distinguish the
execution of high public trusts, candidates for those positions must
be men of virtue, as well as men of character and capability ; and
the stability of our institutions in a great measure depends upon
the confidence and esteem in which those occupying such high positions are held by their fellow-citizens. This cannot be attained if
charges of crime against them, which are falsely made or circulated
in the community, are absolutely privileged, though made in good
faith. I think the circuit judge erred in laying down such rule.
If the charges were false, and made in an honest belief of their
truth; after reasonable and proper investigation, such fact would go
to mitigate the damages, and under certain circumstances, such as
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are alluded- to in Bailey v- Kalatazoo PublisinfCo., the jury
would be warranted in reducing the damages to a minimumr.
In the case under consideratioa the parties were both residents
of the city of Bg Rapids-, and they had resided there over tea
years- It would seem an easy matter for the defend-arnt to have
informed himself of the truth of the statement of facts made in- the
article published-. He- testifies that'he had no personal ill will
against the plaintiff, and knew him very welL It seems- reasonable,
not as asking too much, for him li the course of his investigation to
have called upon the plaintiff and requested, a statement as to the
truth of the charges he had heard and was about to repeat. The
reasonableness of his investigation, however, was for the jury, under
all the circumstances, from which, they were to deduce the fact
whether the publication was made in good faith, andwith an honest
purpose ta enlighten the public upon the character and- fitness of
the plaintiff for the position he sought. The article claims, to state
facts, and those facts charged the plaintiff with a crime, and I think
the defendant cannot excuse himself from liability without- proving
the truth of such charges.
The fact that the article was copied from a paper published in an
adjoining county, and- accredited to that paper, was received in
mitigation of damages. This is the law in case of verbal slander,
but the rule does not necessarily always obtain in cases of libel It
must depend upon the circumstances of the particular case.
The judgment must be reversed, and a new trial granted.
L
(The other justices concurred.)
The two principal cases form an important addition-to the literature upon the interesting question therein discusseT. In
the case of Express PrintingCo. v. Copeland, recently decided. by the Supreme
Court of Texas, and reported in 24 Am.
Law Reg. (N. S-) 640, the rule was
laid down, that where a person consents
to become a candidate for public office
conferred by a popular election, he should
be considered as putting his character in
issue so far as respects his qualifications
for the office; and that whatever pertains to the qualification of the candidate
for the office sought is alegitimate subject
for dis eusion and comment ; but statements and comments made must be con-

fined to the truth, or what in good faith.
and upon probable cause is believed to be
true, and the matter must relate to the
suitableness or unfitness of the candidate
for the office.
A careful study of that case convinced
us of its correctness and it is unnecessary
to repeat what we there said. The principal case of Briggs v. Garrett, lays
down substantially the same doctrine as
the case above referred to, and we do not
understand the dissenting judges to question this principle. Their contention was
only that the question of good fitith, belief
in the truth of the statement and the existence of actual malice, were questions for
the jury.
IERCuR, J., said : "It may
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be asked, are the people to be prevented
Bronson v. Bruce, it seems to us that the
from criticizing and discussing the con- learned judge who tried the case at nisduct, character and qualifications ofa can- priu. made a very clear and concise statedidate for office ? Undoubtedly they are ment of the law as it seems to be estabnot. They must, however, confine them- lislied bythe weight of modern authority.
selves within the limits of truth, or per- It seems to us that the learned judge who
mit a jury to pass upon their good faith delivered the opinion of the appellate
and motive when they make a false court has drawn a picture of the evils
flowing from the rule laid down in the
charge:" Starkie, Slander 110.
The case of Mfarks v. Baker, 28 Minn. court below, rather more lurid than the
162, referred to by the court in Briqys facts will warrant. He says, "Under
v. Garrett, is of more than ordinary in- such a rule the advocates of both or all
terest in this connection. In that case candidates would let fly their poisoned
the plaintiff was treasurer of the city of
shafts of defamation and charges, to be
Mainkato, and a candidatefor re-election. met by counter-charges, until the bewil-The defendants being residents and tax- dered voter not knowing who or what to
payers of said city, published a commu- believe, must of necessity shut his eyes to
nication in a newspaper published in the fitness and character of the candidates
said city, of which they were editors and join the ranks of the party whose
and proprietors, charging or insinuating banner bears the inscription 'Principles
that the plaintiff had, as appeared by not men?'" Qualified as is the doctrine
certain official reports, failed to account of the court in this case by the rule relatfor city funds which had come into his ing to the mitigation of damages, it is on
hands as such treasurer, and that (as grounds of public policy, impossible to
plaintiffs claimed) he had embezzled a deny that it is a reasonable rule; but the
portion of such funds; and it was held old rule laid down in the case of King v.
that such publication, if made in good
Root, and other similar cases approved
faith, was privileged.
by the court in the principal case, is one
The case of Crane v. Waters, 10 Fed. which, as it seems to us, will not ultiRep. 619, also supports the doctrine of
mately prevail in this country ; and we
Brigqs v. Garrett. In thai case LoWELr,, are not aware that a more satisfactory
J., said: "The modern doctrine, as state of morality on the part of the pubshown by the cases cited for the defend- lie
press exists in New York and other
ants, appears to be that the public has a states adhering to that doctrine than in
right to discuss, in good faith, the public Pennsylvania, Minnesota, and other
conduct and qualifications of a public states adopting the rule laid down in
man, such as a judge, an ambassador, Briggs v. Garrett. Upon the whole, it
&c., with more freedom than they can seems clear that the weight of modern
take with a private matter or with the anthority supports the rule laid down in
private conduct of any one. In such Briggs v. Garrettx and that so long as
discussions they are not held to prove the trial by jury is preserved, there is no imexact truth of their statements, provided mediatdanger of the subversion of the
they are not actuated by express malice, social fabric from the general adoption
and that there is reasonable ground for of the rule of this case.
their statements or inferences, all of
M. D. EwEan.
which is for the jury."
Chicago.
With reference to the principal case of
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&uPreme Court of Indian..
KREAMER tr. S-TATE.
Under a statute imposing a fine for the sale of liquor to a minor, no conviction
can be had. if the accused made the sale to the minor after the exercise cf proper
caution, and in the honest belief that the purchaser was of lawful age.
An indictment, charging a single sale to one person only, for one price, ofa number of commodities, the unlawfui sale of either one of which, wouId, under the statute constitute a public offence, isnot bad for duplicity.
APPEAL from

Clark Circuit Court.

B. C. Vance and John IF Stotsenburg, for appellant.
The Attorney- General, for- the state.
The opinion of the court was d-elivered by
Howic, J.-In this case, the indictment charged that, at Clark
county, on the first day of June 1885, Christina Kreamdr did then
and there, for the price of ten cents, unlawfully sell to Calvin Henley,
a person then and there under the age of-twenty-one years, intoxicating, spirituous, vinous and malt liquors.
Under appellantes
arraignment and plea of not guilty, the issue joined by consent
was tried by the court ; and a finding was made that she was. guilty
as charged in the indictment, and her puiishment was assessed at a
fine of $20. Over appellants motion for a new trial, judgment was
rendered against her for the fine assessed and cdsts.. Errors are
assigned here by appellant, which call in question the overruling
(1)of her motion to quash the indictment; and (2 of her motion
for a new trial. We will consider these alleged errors, and decide
the questions thereby presented, in the order of their statement.
1. Did the trial court err in overruling appellant's motion to
quash the indictment? This motion was in writing, and two causes
were assigned therein for quashing the indictment, namely " First,
the indictment does not state any statutory offence : and, second,
for duplicity in such indictment, whereby the same is bad." It is
manifest that it was intended to charge appellant, in and by the
indictment against her, with the statutory offence which is defined,
and its punishment prescribed in sect. 2094, Rev. Stat. 1881. So
far as applicable to the case in hand, this section of the statute provides as follows:
"Whoever, directly or indirectly, sells * * * any spirituous,
vinous, malt, or other intoxicating liquors, to any person under the
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age of twenty-one years, shall be fined in any sum not more than
one hundred dollars, nor less than twenty dollars."
Appellant's learned counsel very earnestly insist, in their brief
of this cause, that the indictment, the substance of which we have
heretofore given, is bad for duplicity in this: that it charges, in a
single count, the unlawful sale of spirituous, vinous, malt and intoxicating liquors. The indictment is badly constructed, and on
that score is justly subject to criticism, but we do not think it can
be correctly charged with duplicity, in the proper sense of that;
term, as applied to an indictment or other pleading." It charges a
single sale to one person only, for one price, of a number of commodities, the unlawful sale of either one of which commodities
would, under the statute, constitute a public offence. In other
words, the indictment charges appellant with only one public offence
punishable with only one punishment. In the recent cases of Davis
v. State, 100 Ind. 154, and Fahnestock v. State, 102 'Id. 156, we
have held, and correctly so we think, that such an indictment is not
bad for duplicity. See, also, Stockwell v. State, 85 Ind. 522;
Stout v. State, 93 Id. 150, and Stout v. State, 96 Id. 407. The
motion to quash the indictment in the case under consideration was
correctly overruled.
2. Under the alleged error of the court in overruling appellant's
motion for a new trial, it is claimed by her counsel that the evidence
in the record shows, without conflict, that she made the sale of intoxicating liquor to Calvin Henley, as charged in the indictment,
after exercising proper caution in the reasonable and honest belief
that he was, at the time of such sale, of full and lawful age. We
are of opinion that this claim of appellant's counsel is fully sustained by the record of this cause. Under our decisions, such a,
sale of intoxicating liquor to a minor, made under such circumstances, is not a criminal violation of our statute, making the sale
of such liquor to a minor a public offence : State v. KaI6, 14 Ind.
403; Bineman v. State, 24 Id. 80; Goetz v. State, 41 Id. 162;
Payne v. State, 74 Id. 203; Bfunter v. State, 101 W4. 241. Appellant's motion for a new trial ought to have been sustained.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.
Much of the law applicable to sales
of intoxicating liquors to habitual drunkards is doubtless applicable to sales to'
minors, but this note is confined to the
latter class of prohibited sales.

1.The doctrine laid down in the main
case, that a sale of liquor to a minor
upon the exercise of proper caution and
in the belief that the minor is of lawful
age, is not a criminal offence under stat.
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utes shnilar to the one cited in the opinion, wherein intent is not mentioned as
an element of the offence, is sustained by
a line of decisions irL
Indiana, and by the.
authority of other states : Moore v.
,Slate, 65 Ind. 3S2 ; lVard v. State, 48
Id. 289 ; Farbach v. State, 24 Id. 77;
Brown v. State, Id.113 - Adler v. State,
55- Ala. lMr; Jarshallv. State, 49 Id.
21 ;Reich v. Sate, 63 Ga. 616 ; lFalks
v. People, 39 Alich. 200, and cases cited
in opinion.
In Goetz v. State, 41 Ind. 162, the
court said: "1Tile most important question in the case is, whether the defendant was acting in good faith, supposing
the witness to have been an adult at the
time. he. sold the whiskey." But in tile
foregoing class of cases, proof of the sale
and of the buyer's minority makes irprima
facie case, to meet which the seller must
show both that he believed, and had
reason to believe- the minor to be of lawful age: Payne v. &late',74 Ind. 203 ;
Goetz Y. State, 41 Id. 162 ; State v.
Kalb, 14 Id. 403 . Reich v. State, 63Ga. 616. And in Marshallv. State,49Ala. 21, itwas said, "the burden of
proof is on the defendant and he must
prove his good intention beyond a reasonable doubt." Inquiring his age of

nor mention intent as an element of the
offence, the seller is- conclusively liable,
however honest and well foumed his
belief in the lawful age of the minor :
Redmonct v. State, 36 Ark. 58; Crampton, v. State, 37 Id. 108 ; Edgarv. State,
Ibid. ; Pounders v. SFate, Id. 399;
thpin v. Gadesburg, 12 ll. App. (Brad.)
200; Dudtley v. %utbine, 49r Ia. 650-;
Roberge v. Burnhain, 124- Mass. 277 ;
State v. Cain, 9 W. Va 559 ; State v.
Gilmore, Id. 64.
In State i. Bhartfiel, 24 Wis. 60, the
court saidr: "The words 'knowingly'
and- ' wilfully,' or other words of
equivalent import, are omitted from the
statute, and the offence is made to consist solely in the fact of a sale of intoxicating liquors or drinks to a minor. Of
t is nature are many fiscal, police and
other laws and regulations, for the mere
violation of which, irrespective of the
motives or knowledge of the party, certain penalties are enactet; for the law-,
in those cases, seems to bind the party
to know the facts, and to obey the law
at his peril The act in question- is a
police regulation, and we have no doubt
that the legislature intended to inflict the
penalty, irrespective of the knowledge or
motives of the person who has violated
tile minor is not sulfficient: Reich y.
its provisions. Indeed if this were not
State, supra,
so, it is plain that thlis statute might be
"It is more important that the young violated times without number, with no
should he protected from temptation, thark possibility of convicting offenders, and
that those who have not reached their so it would become a dead letter on the
majority should be able to purchase with statute book, and the evil aimed at by
facility; and therefore, the vendor the legislature remain almost wholly
should be held to the exercise of great untouched." '
care and caution:" Rineman v. State, 24
"The law imposes upon the licensed
Ind. 80.
seller the dnty to see that the party to
In determining the question of the ven- wlom he sells is authorized to buy, and
dor's bona.fides, the appearance of the if he makes a sale without this knowminor at the time of trial is not an cle- ledge, lie does it at his peril. This is the
ment for the jury's consideration: Rob- clear meaning of the law, and any other
indits
v. State, 63 Ind. 235 ; hlinger v. construction would render it exceedlingly
State, 53 Id. 251.
difficult, if at all possible, ever to pro2. In opposition to the doctrine of the cure a conviction for a violation of this
mail case, the weight of authority favors clause of the statute. This construction
the doctrine that where the statute does imposes no hardship upon the licensed
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seller. If he does not know the party
who seeks to buy intoxicating liquors at
his counter is legally competent to do so,
fie must refuse to make the sale :"
McCutcheon v. People, 69 Ill. 601.
It is incumbent on the vendor of
liquors to know that his customer labors
under no disability, as it is for him to
know the law, and his ignorance of
neither will excuse him :" Ulrichv. Commonwealth, 6 Bush (Ky.) 400.
"It is not as though it was lawful to
sell generally. Being unlawful to sell
to any and all classes, he applied for and
obtained a license to sell only to a portion of the community, and he must see
that he sells to only such as is permitted
by his license :" Fanner v. People, 77
Ill. 322.
"The business in which the liquor
vendor engages is an unlawful business
except under circumstances, and when
he sells he assumes the burden of knowing that these circumstances exist. * * *
When one sells intoxicating liquors, he
must know at his peril whether'or not
a lawful sale can be made to the purchaser:" .Tamison v. Burton, 43 Ia.
282.
"It has been held, that while an honest
and reasonable belief in the lawful age
of the minor is no defence to a criminal
action, it may be shown in mitigation of
the offence :" Crampton v. State, 37 Ark.
108.
3. Where the words "Iwilfully'l
"knowingly," or words of like import
are used, the prosecution must show that
the seller" knew orhad reason to know"
that the buyer was a minor: Perry v.
Edwards, 44 N. Y. 223 ; Bunter v. &ate,
18 Tax. App. 444.
4. Where the statute provides for the
sale of liquor to minors upon the consent
of parents, guardians, physicians, &c.,
the seller must be careful to come within
a strict construction of the statute : Tamison v. Burton, 43 Ia. 282 ; State v. Fairfield, 37 Me. 517.
The seller must show such consent:

Farrellv. State, 32 Ala. 557; Edgar v.
State, 37 Ark. 219 ; Pounders v. State,
Id. 399. And if no person be living
capable of giving the required consent
there can be no legal sale: Waller v.
State, 38 Ark. 657.
Where the statute makes no provision for sales upon the consent of
parents, &c., such consent when given
will constitute no defence to an action .
Rain v. State, 61 Ala. 75; Adler v.
State, 55 Id. 16; State v. Clottu, 33
Ind. 409; Grepel v. State, 32 Ohio St.
167.
5. Where the statute is to the effect
that "whoever by himself or his agent
or servant shall sell," &c. (Ill. Stat.),
the authorities are not agreed upon the
question of the principal's liability for
unauthorized sales by his agent. Some
states maintain that in such a sale there
can be na criminal intent on the part of
the principal and therefore no offence :
Zeller v. State, 46 [nd. 304 ; Thompson
v. State, 45 Id. 495; Lauer v. State, 24Id. 131 ; Anderson v. State, 22 Ohio St.
305.
In Hanson v. ,Sate,43 Ind. 550, the
court, holding such a sale no offence,
said: "But can we presume that the
defendant when he left the bartender in
charge of the bar, made him his agent
to sell to a minor, an act which would
be in violation of law?"
On the other hand, the liability of the
principal for his agent's sales, unauthorized and even contrary to instructions,
has been strongly argued: Dudltey v.
Sautbine, 49 Ia. 650 ; McCutcheon v.
People, 69 I. 601 ; -oberge v. Burnham, 124 Mass. 277.
"The law says to persons wishing to
engage in selling spirituous liquors, orto be interested in the sales thereof, you
must be careful in the selection of your
partners, or servants, and watchful of
'their conduct -in your business; for if
they make forbidden sales, you are responsible. * * * If you are not willing
to engage or be interested in the busi-
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ness on these terms, there is no compulsion upon you to do so :" Robinson v.
State, 3S Ark. 641.
"They forbade hi'm [barkeeper], to
sell liquor to minors. So did the law.
His duty was no more clearly defined
nor made any more imperative by such
instructions or commands. * * * Under
his employment to sell over their counter
in the general course of their tradc, he
was placed in a position by them where
he was necessarily called upon to exercise a discretion in determining the
legality of every proposed sale, and it
must he held that in passing upon such
a question, and in the-determination- of
tile fact, according to his best judgment,
he was acting within the authority conferred upon him and within the scope of
his employment -' 1Ryna v. Galesburg,
12 Ill. App. (Bradw.) 200.
6. One present at an illegal sale, aiding in the capacity of change.maker, i
liable: Johnson v. People, 83- Ill. 431.
Where the liquor is sold tr an adult, by
whom it is given to a minor, tobedrank at
the bar, the sellerhas been held not liable,
unless the buyer was obviously the agent
of the minor: Siegel v. People-, 106 II.

89. But otherwise if the seller knows
that the liquor is purchased for the minor State v. Munson, 25 Ohio St. 3s1.
" The fact that it may have been purchased by the defendant, withl money
furnished in whole or in part by the
minor, whereby the liquor became the
property of the minor, will not relieve
the defendant of guilt" on a charge of
illegal giving: Commonwealth v. Davis,
12 Bush (Ky.) 240.
"Nor will it be a defence, that the
liquor was sent for with money, by a
third person, to whom it might lawfully
have been sold, and that the agent was
so informed when he delivered it to the
minor : State v. Fairfieldt, 37 Me. 517;
Commonwealth- v. -innegar, 124 Mass.
324 ; Bain v. State, 61 Ala. 75. But
see Commonwealth v. Lattinville, 120
Mass. 385 ; Randall v. State, 14 0. Sr.
435. See, also, Ross v. People, 17 Hun
591.
Where the charge is for selling or giving liquor to a minor, "the ownership
of the liquor is not an ingredient of thotfence."
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Supreme Court of Ohio.
JAMIES v. BOARD OF COMIISSIONERS OF ALLEN COUNTY.
Where an employee, engaged under a contract for a specified time, the wages being
payable in instalments, is wrongfully discharged before the expiration of the period
of hire, and all wages actually earned at the time of the discharge have been paid,
an action will not lie to recover the future instalments as though actually earned,
but the remedy is by action for damages arising from thebreach of the contract, and
one recovery ipon such claim is a bar to a future action.

ERROR to District Court Allen County.
Isaiah Pillarsand Proph~et & Eastman, for plaintiff in error.
.ifead 4. Townsend, for defendant in error.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
SPEAR, J.-This action is brought to recover for wages claimed
VOL. XXXIV.-66
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to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff upon a contract made
December 13th 1881, whereby, in consideration that plaintiff would
faithfully and diligently serve the defendant as superintendent of
the stone and brick work in the construction of the court-house then
in progress of erection at Lima, until the stone and brick work
should be completed, &c., the defendant agreed to employ plaintiff
as such superintendent during the period aforesaid, and to pay him
for his services at the end of each and every month the sum of $100.
The petition avers that the plaintiff entered upon the employment,
and discharged the duties thereof until April 6th 1882; when although the stone and brick work was not completed, and the plaintiff was, and has since been, ready and willing to perform all the
.conditions of said agreement upon his part, the defendant refused to
allow him so to do, and to pay him therefor, and discharged him
therefrom without any reasonable cause, and has since hitherto
refused to employ plaintiff for the remainder of said term. On the
18th day of August 1883, plaintiff duly requested defendant to pay
him his wages due him for his services upon and by reason of said
contract for the period of two months from the 18th day of June
1882, to the 13th day of August 1882, which defendant refuses to
do, whereby plaintiff has lost the wages he otherwise would have
obtained from said employment from said 13th June 1882, to said
1ath August 1882, to his damage in the sum of $200, for which,
with interest from August 13th 1882, he asks judgment. The
answer of the defendant sets up in bar an alleged former recovery
for the same cause of action between the same parties, upon the same
contract, at the October Term 1882, of the Court of Common Pleas
of Allen county, at which term. a judgment upon the merits was
rendered in favor of plaintiff for $205.30. The petition of the
plaintiff in the former case is set out, and is identical with the petition in the present case, except as to time, the pleader averring in
the first petition, loss of wages from April 13th 1882, and asking
to recover for that. To this answer a demurrer was interposed,
which was overruled by the Court of Common Pleas, and judgment
entered for defendant, which judgment was affirmed by the District
Court. To reverse this judgment of affirmance the present action
is prosecuted in this court. The question presented is whether,
under such a contract as is here set out, the employee can, after
being discharged, nothing being due him for wages actually earned,
maintain an action for each instalment as though earned, upon an
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allegation of readiness to perform the work ; or whether his action
is simply one for damages for the employer's breach of contract, and
he is limited to one action and one recovery for such damages. If
he can have his option as to these remedies, then the cause of action
in the first petition was not the same as in the present one, and the
former judgment would not be a bar; if he cannot, but is limited
to the last-named remedy, to wit, to damages, for breach of the contract, then, if both are based upon the same breach, it would follow
that they are identical, and that one vacancy would necessarily exhaust the plaintiff's remedy, and so the former recovery would be a
bar. There is but one dismissal-but one breach-pleaded. The
dismissal was one act; and as to the recovery of damages for that,
plaintiff could not split up his cause of action, recovering a part of
his damages in one suit, and the remainder afterwards. He must
include all that belonged to that cause of action in his first petition,
so that one suit and one recovery should settle the rights of the parties. It would be at his own risk and peril if he negligently or
ignorantly omitted a part of what might properly have been embraced in the cause of action, in his first suit. His mistake, if he
made one, might be matter- of regret, but that could not change the
rule of law.
The contention in support of plaintiff's claim, is that neither
action was brought to recover damages for breach of contract on the
part of the board, but that the plaintiff, having his option, upon
being discharged, either to regard the contract as broken by the
conduct of the employer, and sue immediately for damages for its
breach, or treat the contract as subsisting for all purposes, and
maintain an action for each instalment as it became due, chose the
latter, and this he might do, because, having been discharged without fault on his part, his rights were not lessened, nor was he bound
to treat the contract as at an end. Having this choice of remedies,
it is insisted one suit to recover upon instalments past due at
the commencement of the action, and judgment thereon, would not
bar a future recovery upon instalments becoming due thereafter.
A contrary view, it is argued, would entail great injustice. Under it
the employee would be compelled, unless he were content with such
meagre damages as he could prove immediately after his discharge,
or, at most, with less than his real loss, to wait until all were due
before recovering anything; and, inasmuch as the object in contracting for pay by the month probably was that he might thus
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support himself and family, they would be left to suffer while waiting for the last instalment to become due, and he would thus be
driven, in any event, to unreasonable hardship and to a sacrifice of
his rights because of the wrongful act of the employer-a condition
of affairs which the law would not justify.
That the doctrine contended for apneals strongly to the feelings,
and is not without plausibility, woula seem to be apparent from the
statement, and that it has met with the favor of courts in several
instances is apparent from an examination of the cases cited by
counsel. Still the question remains, does it rest upon solid foundation?
The first case in order of time is that of Gandell v. Pontgny, 4
Camp. 875, decided at Nisi Prius term of the King's Bench by
Lord ELLENBOROUGH in 1816. Plaintiff was clerk for defendant
at 2001. per year, payable quarterly. August 11th, defendapt discharged plaintiff, and paid him for half quarter between July 1st
and August 15th. Plaintiff denied the power to discharge, and
offered next day to continue work, which defendant declined. Lord
ELLENOR0 OUGH'S decision is as follows: "If the plaintiff was discharged without sufficient cause, I think this action maintainable.
Having served a part of the quarter, and being willing to serve the
residue, in contemplation of law, be may be considered to have
served the whole. The defendant was therefore indebted to him for
work and labor in the sum sought to be recovered."
John William Smith in his note to Cutter v. Powell, 2 Smith
Lead. Cas., pt. I., says that "a servant wrongfully dismissed has
his election of three remedies: First,a special action for breach of
contract, and he may pursue this remedy at once; Second, he may
wait until the termination of the period for which he was employed,
and then, perhaps, sue for his whole wages in indebitatus assumpeit,
relying on the doctrine of constructive service;" and he cites
Gandell v. Pontigny.
Two cases are cited from the Supreme Court of New York, where
a similar doctrine is held. In Huntington v. Ogdensbuqh &L. C.
Bd., reported in 7 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 143, decided by JAmEs, J.,
the holding is that "where a person employed for a certain term at
a fixed salary, payable monthly, is wrongfully discharged before the
end of the term, he may sue for each month's salary as it becomes
due, and the first judgment will not bea bar to another action for
salary subsequently coming due.
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In the case of Thomvson- v. Wood, 1 Hilt. 96, INGRAHAM, J.,
says, " When an. agreement of this kind is broken, the person has
his election either to sue for his wages as- they become due from time
to time, or to bring one action for damages for breach of the contract." This holding that the employee may sue for wages as they
become due from time to time, was not necessary to a decision of
the case, and was apparently based upon the holding of Lord
ELLENDBOROUGH, before quoted.
Strauss v. Aeertief, 64 Ala. 299, is to the same effect. BICxELL, J., in deciding the case, says : "It is not matter of doubt that
when a contract is made for personal services for a particular term
at stipulated wages, if the party employed is, without cause, discharged during the term, *

'

* he is not- compelled to accept the

breach of his employer as a termination of the contract. He may
elect to treat it as continuing, and, keeping himself in readiness to
perform the contract on his-part, may recover the wages due on the
expiration of the term; and if the wages are payable by instalments,
he may sue for and recover each instalment as it becomes due."
Other cases by the same court hold a like doctrine, and it seems
to have been accepted by the courts of Mississippi, Missouri, Illinois-and Wisconsin.
The decisions in these cases appear to rest upon the doctrine of
"constructive service." In several of them it is adopted in words;
in others the principle is assumed without designating it by that
title. If that is fiot their basis, it is difficult to see that they have
any. The theory of that doctrine seems to be that, inasmuch as the
employee holds himself to do the work, therefore he has done the
work; that readiness is, for all purposes, equivalent to performance.
For the purpose of allowing a recovery in some amount his readiness to do and tender of performance may have the effect of performance to the extent of putting the employer in the wrong; but
how can it be said, in truth, that he has done the work-that he
has performed? The claim is based upon a fiction, an untruth.
There is no acceptance of the services; there is no delivery of
them; the defendant has not had the benefit of them; he has
not had value received; and upon what principle is it that in law
he is liable for the agreed price when he has not received the commodity which he agreed to buy, and the other party has not parted
with the commodity which he agreed to sell? The doctrine of
"constructive service," as applied to a case of this character, is
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one-beset with difficulties. It requires a plaintiff to assume that to
exist which in fact has no existence. He is demanding wages when
he is rendering no service. The doctrine contradicts the very term
itself. How can he truthfully aver, as in indebitatuaassumpsit,that
the defendant is indebted to him for work and labor dane ? Averring it, how could he prove it ? But aside from the matter of pleading and proof, in order to recover upon the strength of this doctrine
the employee must not only be willing to perform on his part, but
must hold himself in readiness to perform. This implies that he
will remain idle. Public policy, not to say public morals, forbids
the encouragement of an idle class. - Being subject to the universal
rule that a person by the act of another is bound to use ordinary
diligence to make the damages as light as may be, the discharged
employee must use ordinary care to obtain employment. He may
not be required to seek elsewhere, or to engage in a different industry. But he is bound to use ordinary effort to obtain similar employment in the same vicinity. At least if such employment is
offered, he is bound to take advantage of it. It would be a direct
encouragement to idleness to hold that he who may have, but refuses,
similar services, is entitled to fall compensation the same as though
he performed full labor. This rule stands squarely across the path
of "constructive service ;" for, if the workman is bound to accept
employment of another employer, how can he continue ready to
resume work under his former employer? A learned writer, whose
valued paper in support of the doctrine of "1constructive service" is
cited by counsel uses this language: "The doctrine of constructive
service, however, does not permit an employee who has been wrongfully discharged, to remain wilfully idle during the period for which
he has been engaged." A most singular conception of the groundwork of the- doctrine, it seems to us. Being actually at work for
B., how can he be constructively at work for A. ? Being required
to hold himself in readiness to resume his work for A., how can he
engage with B. ? Engaging with B., how can he be ready to
resume work with A.?
" Constructive service," as here sought to be applied, never had,
as we think, support in principle, and, in large measure, the support
heretofore found for it upon authqrity has disappeared. The case
of aandell v. Pontigny, after being followed in several cases in
England; was overruled in Archard v. Hornor, 3 Car. & P. 349,
which was approved in Smith v. Hayward,7 Adol. & E. 544, and
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in the later case of Goodman v. Pocock, 1& Adol. & E. (N.S.)
576. To like effect- will be found Beekkam v. Drake, 2 11. L. 606,
and in Bmineng v. Elderton, 4 I. L. 645. Mr. Smith's second
proposition in his notes to Cutter v. -Powell,is expressly disproved
in Goodman v. Pocock ; ERLE, J., giving as a reason why it was
not maintainable, that" the servant would not, if it were true, be
permitted to engage in any other work, and would be compelled to
remain idle and unemployed, while it is undoubtedly the law that
he should use due diligence in seeking other like employment in
the same vicinity, and not eat the bread of idleness." And in
Clossman v. Lacoste, 28 Eng. Law & Eq. 140, a still later case,
Lord CAMPBELL says: "But if the contract is entirely broken, and
the relation of employer and employed put an end to, I agree that
the party suing ought to allege in his declaration the whole gravamen that he suffers by such breach of contract, that he may receive
therein all the damages that may inure to him in consequence."
So that it may not be too much to say that the doctrine of" constructive service" has, in England, where it had its origin, been
repudiated, and the law there established that a servant wrongfully
discharged has no action for wages unless something is due for past
services actually rendered; and as to any other claim on the contract it is for the breach of it, and for his damages resulting therefrom,being the ordinary action for damages, and not the commonlaw action of indebitatus assumpsit.
Nor are the cases in New York, heretofore referred to, now authority in that state. For this, see Moody v. Leverich, 4 Daly
401, where the holding is to the effect that a servant wrongfully
dismissed, cannot wait until the expiration of the period, and then
sue for his whole wages on the ground of constructive service, his
only remedy being an action for breach of the contract of hiring.
Also, Howard v. Dalj, 61 N. Y. 862, where Gandell v. Pontigny,
Tho son v. Wood, and the cases in Alabama, Misissippi, Missouri,
and Wisconsin are distinctly disapproved, and the doctrine of 'constructive service" declared to, be "so opposed to principle, so clearly
hostile to the great mass of authorities, and so wholly irreconcilable to that great and beneficent rule of law, that a person discharged from service must not remain idle, but must accept employment elsewhere if offered, that we cannot accept it. * * * The
doctrine of constructive service is not only at war with principle,
but with the rules of political economy, as it encourages idleness,
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and gives compensation to men who fold their arms and decline service equal with those who perform with willing hands their stipulated amount of labor."
The cases of Chamberlin v. JMorgan, 68 Penn. St. 169; Vil,loughby v. Thomas, 24 Gratt. 522; Whitaker v. Sandifer, 1 Duv.
261; Chamberlin v. McCallister, 6 Dana 852; and Miller v.
Goddard,34 Me. 102, show that a like view is held by the courts
in those states; while Wood's Mayne Dam. 317, 328, and Wood
Mast. & Ser. 246, 247, indicate that the author considers the great
weight of authority to be in the same direction. On page 246, of
the latter work, Mr Wood uses the following emphatic language:
"It (the doctrine of constructive service) was finally exploded,
and the doctrine established that a person wrongfully discharged
could n6t, by simply holding himself in readiness to perform his
contract, be regarded as having in fact performed it, and thus be
entitled to sue for and recover his wages for the entire term, but
that he must be restricted in his recovery to the amount of his
actual loss. The action in such cases is not for wages, but for breach
of contract. It cannot with any propriety be claimed that an action
for wages can be sustained when the servant has in fact rendered
no service. Such a doctrifie is in defiance of the meaning of the
term, and rests upon no solid foundation either in principle or
policy."
See also an instructive paper by Mr. Thornton, of the Indianapolis bar, on this subject in 8 South. Law Rev. 432; and for a full
discussion of the present case, see the able opinion of the judge who
presided in the Common Pleas, reported in 9 Law Bulletin 186.
To sustain the doctrine of "constructive service" would be in
effect to hold that the contract is one which could be enforced specifically ; for if, after discharge, and after the employer had repudiated the contract on his part, and laid himself liable to full damages
for its breach, the employee could treat the contract as subsisting in
such sort as to recover upon instalments as wages earned, when in
fact they were not earned, and recover as each came due, the result
would be a specific performance of the contract and that too, by a
multiplicity of suits. Surely, no lawyer would seriously ask a
court of equity to specifically enforce a contract which in its nature
gives to the aggrieved party so plain and full a remedy at law in
an action for damages.
As a result from authority as -vell as upon principle, we are
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satisfied that such a contract as the one in the case at bar, where
the employee is wrongfully dismissed, but all wages actually earned
up to that time are paid, the only action the employee has, whether
he brings it at once or waits until the entire period of hire has
expired, is one for damages for the breach of the contract, and the
measure of damages will be the loss or injury occasioned by that
breach; and one recovery upon such claim, whether the damages'
be denominated loss of wages or damages for breach is a bar to a
future recovery.
The-judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
The doctrine that an employee wrong- is held, that the duty of the servant
fully discharged before the expiration of upon being discharged, is to seek other
the term of hire, can, by waiting until employment, and thereby decrease the
such time and holding himself in readi- damages. BsucKELL, C. J., says:
ness to perform, recover the full amount
"The only loss for which, in this action
of his %vagesfrom the time of discharge founded on the contract, compensation
to the end of the term, has been either can be claimed, is the wages which
directly or indirectly repudiated in seve- would have been earned. But the next
ral states-: Ricks v. Yates, 5 Ind. 115;
day, or at any other intermediate period,
Weed v. Burt, 79 N. Y. 191; Madden like employment, at the same, or greater
v. Porterfiddq 8 Jones L. 16 ; Sherman wages, by a party as to whom there is
no just exception is offered him; or he
T. Trans. Co., 31 Vt. 162 ; Heimn v.
Wolf, 1 E. D. Smith 70; Rogers v. can obtain it by the exertions made ordiParham, 8 Ga. 190; McDaniel v. narily by men out of employment. What
Parks, 19 Ark. 671. But, on thmother damages has he sustained, except the
hand, there is considerable authority to loss of wages when the act ofthe defendthe effect that, where the servant has ant left him necessarily unemployed ?
been discharged without any fault upon He may not continue unemployed from
his part, he may recover the full amount choice, merely to recover from the deof his wages to the end of the contract fendant the wages he had contracted to
term, less what he hasbeen able to real- pay. Neither good morals, nor the law,
ize from other employment, and some will countenance him in persisting volcourts have considered this holding to untarily in idleness, that the amount of
recogniso the doctrine of constructive his recovery may not be diminished."
service: Cong. v. Peres, 2 Cald. 620 ; That was a case where the suit was
brought for damages for the breach of the
Kirk v. Hartman, 63 Penn. St. 97;
Hamlin v. Race, 78 Ill. 422; Costigan contract of hire.
v. Mohawk, 6-c., .Rd., 2 Denio 609;
In Thompson: v. Wood, and HuntingBooge v. Pacific, 4e., Rd., 33 31o. 212;
ton v. Ogdensburgh, 4"c., Rd., also cited
Jones Y. Jones, 2 Swan 605 ; Armfield as favoring the rule of constructive serv. Nash, 31 Miss. 361 ; lowler v. Ar- vice, it was in reality decided that the
mour, 24 Ala. 194 ; Olay v. Com. Tel. measure of damages was the wages conCo., 17 W. N. C. 200.
tracted for, less what the plaintiff had
In Strauss v. Mleertef, cited in the earned or might have earned. In both
principal case as holding the plaintiff
of them, however, the actions were for
may recover for constructive service, it wages due, but from the language of the
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judges who delivered the opinions, it is
evident they regarded the amounts recovered more in the light of the damages for the non-fulfilment of the contract
rather than wages for constructive service. See, also, Moody v. Leverich, 4
Daly 401, where the two latter cases are
fully considered and explained. None
of the three cases just cited can be said
to hold to the rule of constructive service: that a wrongfully discharged servant may by waiting and making no
effort to secure work, recover his wages
as though he had actually performed the
service which would entitle him to them.
Gandell v. Pontigny, cited supra, evidently does hold that way, but it was a
nisi prius decision, besides being unsatisfactorily reported.
Other cases have been cited as sustaining the doctrine of constructive service,
but in none of them, upon close inspection, can it be ascertained that they do so
hold: Arjfieldv. Nash, 31 Miss. 361 ;
Gordon v. Brewster, 7 Wis. 355 ; Booge
v. Pacfic Rd., 33 Mo. 212 ; owler v.
Armour, 24 Ala. 194.
A late text writer has said: "The
damages recovered are not for constructive services; but compensation for being
prevented from earning the stipulated
wages according to the contract of hiring:" Sutherland Dam., II. 475.
The authorities generally concede that
the wages for the balance of the contract
term are primafacie the measure of damages to be assessed; but subject to be
lessened by proof on the part of the defence that the plaintiff has earned wages,
or by using reasonable effort might have
done so. The reason for it being, that
the plaintiff cannot, by inactivity on his
part, increase the defendant's damages.
It seems the wages agreed upon are an
aid in determining the damages.
That the discharged servant must use
reasonable diligence to find employment
cannot be doubted; and what is reasonable diligence depends upon all the circumstances of the case: Howard v. Daly,

61 N. Y. 362 ; Byrd v. Boyd, 4 McCord
246 ; Meade v. Rutledge, II Tex. 44.
He is not bound to seek employment
other than that in the same line in which
he has been employed : Straussv. Meertief, supra; or at a distance and among
strangers: Gillis v. Space, 63 Barb.
177: Hamilton v. McPherson, 28 N. Y.
72.
As to burden of proof in cases of this
nature, the rule is that where the defendant alleges the ability of the plaintiff to
get employment, or the fact that he did
get it, in mitigatioli of damages, the
burden of proof is upon him to show it :
Costigan v. Mohawk, 6-c., Rd.; Kirk v.
Hartman; Cong. v. Peres, stpra; Kinga
v. Steiren, 44 Penn. St. 99; Walwortk
v. Poole, 9 Ark. 394. But in some
cases it has been held, the plaintiff must
show his inablity to procure employment,
in making out his case, and if he has
secured it, what he has realized therefrom: Runt v. Crane, 33 Miss. 669;
Hearne v. Garrett, 49 Tex. 619. In
Hunt v. Crane, it was -held, the plaintiff
might show that he found work, or if he
failed to do so, he could show hisinability
after due diligence. But Hearne v. Garrett went further, and declared the plaintiff to be entitled to recover the full
amount "on proof that he had not been
able to get other remunerative employment." This cannot be said to be the
law, notwithstanding the rule seems to
be the more reasonable of the two. The
result of the efforts that have been made
in that direction, lies within the knowledge of theplaintiff, and it could neither
put him to extra expense or inconvenience to adopt such a rule.
Mr. Benjamin, in his work on Sales,
upon the subject of breaches, uses the
following language : "A mere assertion
that the party will be unable or will refuse to perform his contract is not sufficient; it must be a distinct and unequivocal absolute refusal to perform the promise, and must be treated and acted
upon as such by the party to whom the
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promise was made ; for, if he afterwards
continue to urge or demand compliance
with the contract, it is plain he does nor
consider it to be at an end ;" Benj.
Sales, sect. 5 6 8L and cases; Smoot v.
United .tates, 15 Wall. 36. And in a
late case in the Supreme Court of the
United States, it was Aetd, following
Johnstone v. Milling,. 16Q. B. Div. 460,

that "the words or conduct relied on as
a breach of the contract by anticipation
must amount to- a total refusal to perform it and that does not by itself,
amount to a breach of the contract, unless so adopted and acted upon by the
other party :' Dingley r. Oler, 6 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 850.
A. G. " oKEt.

Sureme Court of Vermont
WEAtHERHEAD v.STODDARD.
No estate will be held contingent unless very decided terms of contingency are
used in the will, or it is necessary to hold the same contingent, inorder to carry out
the other provisions or implications of the will.
A. devised real and personal property to trustees to hold in trust for P., with a
direction to apply, from time to time, such portion, or if necessary the whole of the
income to the support-of P., and upon the latter's arrival at the age of eighteen, or
in case of her marriage before that age, then to pay over to her the whole estate or
such portion thereof as in their judgment should seem most for her benefit and advantage, leaving this matter to the best judgment and discretion of the trustees. P.
arrived at the age of eighteen, but the trustees in the exercise of their discretion
withheld the payment of the principal. Upon P.'s death, Aeld, that P. took a
vested estate which passed to her devisees.

J. f. Tyler and Martin & Eddy, for plaintiff.
Baszkin8 &- Stoddard,for defendant.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
ROWELL, J.-Alanson E. Weatherhead died testate in 1862,

leaving only one child surviving him, Phcebe Mary Hope Weatherhead, then about two years old.

His will was duly probated, and

the third clause of it reads as follows:

"I give and bequeath all my estate, real and personal, to Galusha Weatherhead, Marcus Weatherhead, and Lysander W. Howe,

to be held by them in trust for my daughter and only child, Phcebe
Mary Hope Weatherhead; and I hereby direct the trustees above

mentioned to apply from time to time such portion, or if necessary
the whole of the income from said trust estate towards the support,
maintenance, and education of the said Phcebe Mary Hope Weatherhead; and when she shall arrive at the age of eighteen years, or
in case she shall marry before arriving at the age aforesaid, then in

either case the said trustees shall pay over to the said Phcebe Mary
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Hope Weatherhead the whole of the said trust estate, or such portion thereof as in their judgment and discretion shall seem most for
the benefit and advantage of the said Phcebe-and I leave this
matter to the best judgment and discretion of the aforesaid trustees."
By the fourth clause of his will, in case the said Phoebe died
before eighteen, the testator disposed of all. his estate by divers
bequests over.
The said Phoebe was never married, and died testate at about the
age of twenty-three. Her will was duly probated, whereby, after
one or two small specific legacies, she gave the use of the residue
of her estate to Gertrude A. Lynde, now Mrs. Hunt, for life, with
remainder over.
Said trustees retained in their hands all of said estate, paying
therefrom only what was necessary for the support and education
of the said Phoebe, and never paid the same over to her after she
became eighteen, acting in withholding it according to their best
judgment and discretion, and as they deemed most for her benefit
and advantage, and she never demanded it of them.
The plaintiff claims that by the terms of the will, the taking of a
vested interest in her father's estate by the said Phoebe was made
to depend upon the judgment and discretion of the trustees, and as
their judgment and discretion were never exercised in her favor
by paying over the estate to her, she never took a vested interest
therein ; while the defendant claims that she took a vested interest
therein on the death of her father, subject to be defeated only by
her death before eighteen, and that on becoming eighteen, the estate
became hers absolutely, and would have descended to her heirs
had she died intestate, and that, if it did not vest in her at least at
eighteen, then there was no testamentary disposition of it after that,
and so she took it by inheritance.
This last contention is not sound, for there was at all events a
discretionary trust, liable to be executed in favor of the said Plhcbe
by paying the fund over to her at any time after she became eighteen,
and hence there was a testamentary disposition, operative as long
as she lived with the trust unexecuted; for the legal estate which
vested in the trustees by the will, would continue in them as long
as the purposes of the trust required it. BAYEY, J., in -Doe d.
Player v. Yicholk, 1 B. & C. 836.
This brings us to the single question, whether the said Phoebe
ever took a vested interest in this estate.
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The proposition is deducible from the authorities, especially from
the more recent English authorities, that no estate will be held contingent, unless very decided terms of contingency are used in the
will, or it is necessary to hold the same contingent in order to carry
out the other provisions or implications of the will: 2 Redf. Wills
60G.
If the testator had stopped with directingthe trustees to pay over
the estate to his daughter on arriving at eighteen or marrying, it is
clear on all the authorities that the legacy would have vested on the
happening of either of those events, if not before; and so it comes
to this, whether the discretionary clause makesuany difference. We
think it, does not, both on the construction of the will, and on
authority.
When a man sits down to dispose of his property by will, it is
fair to presume that he does not intend to die intestate, nor to
become intestate after death, and so courts lean against intestacy.
Now here the testator made no bequests over except in the single
event of his daughter's- dying before eighteen. If, then, she did
not take a vested interest at least at eighteen, the testator became
intestate at her death, and his estate is left, to be distributed bylaw;
for it would be absurd to read this will as giving bequests over in
case his daughter died after eighteen, as she did. Then again, the
very fact that he made no disposition aver in case she died after
eighteen, is a circumstance of no little weight to show that he
intended his estate to vest in her at all events on her becoming
eighteen: 2 Redf. Wills 606-. In England a gift over in one event
is generally regarded as favoring vesting in all other events, on the
ground that the gift over being made to depend upon particular
events, the presumption is that in every other event the estate was
intended to remain in the first taker. But we think, as said by
Judge REDFIELD, that this form of argument is more forcible when
there is no disposition over, for then it may well be said that the
testator intended the estate to vest in the last donee named.
The trustees were the brothers and a brother-in-law of the testator. He made them his executors, and, reposing confidence in
them, was willing to leave it to them, as trustees, to say when and
to what extent his daughter, after becoming eighteen or marrying,
should be permitted to come into the actual possession and enjoyment of his estate; but we do not think he intended to leave it to
them to say whether she should ever have it at all, or not, in interest.
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He had willed it "in trust for her," and the discretionary clause,
treating it as valid-but as to which see Gray, Perp., sect. 120-was
inserted for her supposed benefit, and more by way of giving directions to the trustees as to the time and manner of payment than. as
importing condition or contingency. And this idea of a trust is
important, and well "nigh decisive of the case. The remarks of
Lord Chief Justice TURNER on this subject, in Oddie v. Brown, 4
DeG. & J. 179, 193, are exceedingly pertinent. He says: "When,
as in this case, funds are given to trustees to be held by them upon
trusts, directions must, of course, be given to them as to the time
and manner in which they are to deal with the funds in favor of
the persons for whose benefit they are intended. Words, therefore,
that in other cases might import condition or contingency, may, in
such cases, be used for a wholly different purpose, namely, for the
purpose of conveying the necessary directions to the trustees. The
court, therefore, in such cases, looks, I apprehend, more to the substance of the gift than to the words in which it is expressed. It
considers for whose benefit it was made-who were intended to be
the cestui8s que trust." And the same idea is brought out by Lord
COTTENHAM, in Saunders v. Tautier, 1 Cr. & Ph. 240, where he
says : "It is argued that the testator's great-nephew does not take
a vested interest in the East India stock before his age of twentyfive, because there is no gift but in the direction to transfer the
stock to him at that age. But is that so? There is an immediate
gift of the stock ; it is to be separated from the estate and vested
in trustees ; and the question is whether the great-nephew is not
the cestui que trust of the stock. It is immaterial that these
trustees are also executors ; they hold the stock as trustees, and
the trust is, to accumulate the income until the great-nephew
attains twenty-five, and then to transfer the stock and the accumulated interest to him. There is no gift over, and the stock either
belongs to the great-nephew or will fall into the residue in the
event of his dying under twenty-five. I am clearly of opinion that
he is entitled to it." It is not enough to say that the Court of
Chancery would not have controlled the judgment and discretion
of these trustees further than to have compelled an honest exercise
thereof, according to Bacon. v. Bacon, 55 Vt. 243 ; Sharon v.
Simons, 30 Id. 458; -French v. Davidson, 3 Mad. 396; and
Walker v. Walker, 5 Id. 424; for that is quite another question
from saying whether this legacy vested, and is not at-all determina-
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tive of it, for the legacy might have vested and yet the legatee not
have been entitled to the possession and full enjoyment of it.
We have carefully examined all the cases cited in argument, and
many others, but shall not attempt to review them all. The first
case to which we desire to call attention is Ciurchill v. Ladr
Speake, 1 Vern. 251, which was this: Prideaux, plaintiff's grandfather, bequeathed to his wife a mortgage of 10001., desiring her to
give 5001. of it to the plaintiff, "1but for the time and manner of
doing it" he left "it freely to herself, and as she shall see 'it best
for her." The testator died about 1664, the plaintiff then being
about nine years old. Mrs. Prideaux, plaintiff's grandmother,
lived till 1683, when she died, making the Lady Speake her executrix, having paid no part of the 500L, neither was the same in all that
time so much as demanded of her. Plaintiff's bill was to have this
legacy' of 500. paid to her, with interest; and the lord keeper,
notwithstanding there was no demand proved, and though the testator left the time and manner of paying to his wife, decreed' the
5001., with interest, from the death of the testator, being near
twenty years. A note to the case- says, that the court was fully
satisfied that the nature of the case was a trust in the grandmother
for the plaintiff.
In Hone's -Executors v. Van Scaick, 20 Wend. 564, the testator gave $6000 to each of his grandchildren who should be living
at the time of his death, to be paid to them respectively on attaining
the age of twenty-one or marrying; such payment, however, not to
be made without the approbation of the parents of such grancchildren expressed in writing; and it was held that the legatees
severally took a vested interest immediately on the death of the
testator. Mr. Justice BRONSON, speaking for the court, said, if
the testator had stopped after directing the legatees to be paid on
attaining twenty-one or marrying, the legacies would' clearly have
been vested, and that the clause requiring the approbation of' the
parents made no difference; that it provided for only a future postponement of the time of payment; that the gift was still absolute,
and referred to Churchillv, Lady Speake, 1 Vern. 251, as authority. It is true that case is a little different from this, for there the
gift was directly to the legatees, while here it is contained in the
direction to pay; but Vice-Chancellor WIGRAM says that the court
never intended to decide that the gift of a legacy under the form
of a direction to pay at a future time or on a given event, was less
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favorable to vesting than a simple and direct gift of a legacy at a
like future time or on a like event, but has intended only to assimilate those cases to each other, and to distinguish both from the
class of cases in which there has been a gift of a legacy and also a
direction to pay at a future definite time distinct from the gift: Leeming v. ,STzerratt, 2 Hare 14, 18.
Millard'sAppeal, 87 Penn. St. 457, is much in point. There
the testator willed to his 'executrix $30,000 in trust, to be put at
interest, and to pay over the interest from time to time, when and
as received, unto his nephew, Joseph M. Millard; and in case the
said Joseph should be sober and industrious in his habits, the executrix was authorized "to pay over to him from time to time such
portions of the principal as she, in her judgment, shall deem right
and proper, or she may, at any time she may deem it right and
proper, pay over to him the whole of the said $30,000. , In the
exercise of the discretion thus conferred upon her, the executrix
had paid to the said Joseph a little more than $4000 of the principal when he died, leaving a widow, the appellant, and one daughter,
Margaret Blanche Millard, and this appeal was taken from a decree
dismissing exceptions filed.to the executrix's final account as trustee

of said fund, on the ground that she had not therein charged herself with the balance of the principal in her hands, and it was held
that the legacy vested. The court said that plainly the testator
intended to give the entire beneficial interest to his nephew, and
that the discretionary clause in no wise affected the question of
intent, but was designed to provide for the nephew, and at the same
time to prevent the fund from being wasted through idleness or
intemperance; that as the condition on which the principal was to
be paid had become impossible of performance by the death of the
nephew, and as the trustee could not keep the money, and there
was no gift over, and it did not pass under the residuary clause,
either the testator died intestate as to this fund, or it must go to the
personal representative of the nephew; that the court regarded the
question as free from doubt, but said, if it did not, it would feel
bound to apply the rule favoring vested rather than contingent
estates, primary rather than secondary intent, The court, indeed,
laid stress on the fact that there was an absolute gift of the income,
and said that a gift of the income of a fund without limitation of
time was a gift in perpetuity and carried the fund itself; and if we
were to adopt plaintiff's theory as to the non-vesting of this legacy

-
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on other grounds, and follow some recent and very respectable English authorities-which we do not find it necessary to do in order
to sustain our judgment-we should have that precise element in
this case, namely, a gift of the income of the entire estate without
limitation as to time. Thus, in Fox v. Fox, L.R., 19 Eq. Gas. 286,
there was a discretionary power in the trustees to apply the whole
income of the fund, or so much thereof as they might, from time to
time, think proper, for the maintenance and education of the legatees until their shares became payable which was at twenty-one, and
the question was whether there was a gift of the whole income,
within the rule laid down in Watson v. Hayes, 5 My. & Cr. 125,
and other cases, that a legacy which, upon the terms- of the gift,
would be contingent on. the legatees, attaining. &certain age, may
become vested by a gift of the interest in the meantime, whether
directly or in the form of maintenance, provided it be the whole
interest; and it was held, on the authority of Harrisonv. Grimwood, 12 Beav. 192, that it was a. gift of the whole income, followed
by a discretion to apply less than the whole, and consequently, that
the legacy vested, "and not the less so because there was a discretion conferred on the trustees to apply less than the whole income
for that purpose."
So in Rouse's Estate, 9 Hare 649, there was a gift of a legacy
in trust, to apply so much of the interest thereof as the trustees
should think proper in the maintenance of the testator's grandson
until twenty-one, and then to pay the whole interest to him for life
and, on his death, to stand possessed of the legacy and interest and
all accumulations in trust for his children, with remainder over in
default of children, and it was held that the provision for maintenance of the grandson during minority, out of the interest, showed
that the interest was intended for him; that the legacy vested in
interest though not in possession before he became twenty-one; and
that he was entitled to the interest that accrued during his minority,
and was not applied to his maintenance; and Wy]nch v. Wynch, I
Cox 433, was regarded as strong authority on the point. There, a
father gave legacies to his daughters, payable at twenty-one or
marriage, but he made provision for their maintenance in the meantime out of another fund; and it was held that the legacies did not
carry interest until the time of payment. But the Master of the
Rolls said, if maintenance had been payable out of the interest of
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